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DUAL USE RESEARCH POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
CAROLE R. BASKIN* AND TODD J. RICHARDSON** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 21, 2013, the U.S. Government released two proposed 
policy documents: the U.S. Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of 
Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (Oversight Policy)1 and the 
Framework for Guiding U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Funding Decisions about Research Proposals with the Potential for 
Generating Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses that are 
Transmissible among Mammals by Respiratory Droplets (H5N1 Funding 
Framework Policy).2 These documents were published almost a year after 
the U.S. Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use 
Research of Concern was released on March 29, 2012 (DURC Policy) and 
were meant to provide guidance for research institutions on implementation 
of the DURC Policy.3 In the proposed policies, the U.S. Government is not 
prescriptive regarding entities within research institutions that should be 
responsible for implementation of this oversight. For many, however, the 
logical choice is the already overextended Institutional Biosafety Committees 
(IBCs),4 in part because IBCs are federally mandated to provide review for 
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Washington, Seattle, Washington. 
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 1. United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use 
Research of Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 12369-70 (proposed Feb. 22, 2013). 
 2. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FRAMEWORK FOR GUIDING FUNDING DECISIONS 
ABOUT RESEARCH PROPOSALS WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR GENERATING HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN 
INFLUENZA H5N1 VIRUSES THAT ARE TRANSMISSIBLE AMONG MAMMALS BY RESPIRATORY DROPLETS 
(2013), http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/funding-hpai-h5n1.pdf. 
 3. United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use 
Research of Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. at 12370. 
 4. Letter from David A. Relman, M.D., FIDSA President, Infectious Diseases S. of Am., to 
Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy 2 (Apr. 23, 2013) (on file 
with authors).  
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research involving “recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules,”5 and 
at least some of this research will involve such agents. Further, most 
institutions have tasked IBCs with oversight of all research-related activities 
with potential biohazards beyond their original mandate.6 Review at the 
institutional level of research with dual use potential may also involve export 
control compliance. 
Consistently, comments on the proposed policies expressed anxiety over 
logistics, costs, and compliance, particularly when it came to restricting the 
flow of scientific information.7 As for compliance, the burden placed on 
Principal Investigators (PIs) to determine and remain vigilant throughout the 
research cycle about the potential for dual use of their research seemed 
unrealistic since most PIs were never trained or conditioned to make such 
determinations, and this emphasis on PIs raised concerns about how blame 
would be placed if, in fact, an incident happened.8 There were also 
questions as to whether the Oversight Policy applied to only whole versions 
of the listed organisms or to subcomponents as well,9 and whether it should 
apply to other organisms or other types of life sciences research.10 Concerns 
were also expressed regarding how resource-intensive the institutional role 
would become, and whether the DURC Policy should be expanded into a 
broader class of experiments or agents.11 Since organisms thus far listed in 
the DURC Policy are all Select Agents,12 the additional scrutiny might be 
unnecessary to begin with.13 Concerns were expressed regarding how 
institutions would handle requests for actual assessment documents made 
 
 5. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT OR 
SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES (2013). 
 6. See Letter from David Relman to Franca Jones, supra note 4, at 2. 
 7. Letter from Judith S. Bond, President, Fed’n of Am. Soc’ys for Experimental Biology, to 
Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy (Apr. 12, 2013) (on file with 
authors). 
 8. Letter from Samuel Evans, Visiting Professor & Academic Coordinator, Univ. of Cal., 
Berkeley, to Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy (Apr. 23, 2013) 
(on file with authors). 
 9. Letter from Alan I. Leshner, Chief Executive Officer & Executive Publisher, Am. Ass’n 
for the Advancement of Sci., to Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director, Office of Sci. & Tech. 
Policy (Apr. 17, 2013) (on file with authors). 
 10. Letter from Samuel Evans to Franca Jones, supra note 8. See also Letter from David 
Relman to Franca Jones, supra note 4, at 2 (recommending a focus not on a specific set of 
pathogens but to focus “oversight on the seven identified categories of experiments”); Carrie 
D. Wolinetz, Implementing the New U.S. Dual-Use Policy, 336 SCI. 1525, 1526 (2012). 
 11. Letter from Hunter R. Rawlings III, President, Association of Am. Univs. and Anthony P. 
DeCrappeo, President, Council on Gov’t Relations, to Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director, 
Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy 1 (Apr. 23, 2013) (on file with authors). 
 12. 42 C.F.R. § 73.3 (2013); 7 C.F.R. § 331.3 (2013); 9 C.F.R. § 121.3 (2013). 
 13. David Malakoff & Martin Enserink, New U.S. Rules Increase Oversight of H5N1 
Studies, Other Risky Science, 339 SCI. 1025, 1025 (2013); Wolinetz, supra note 10, at 1526. 
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under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and sunshine laws in certain 
states.14 Finally, questions arose regarding the transparency of funding 
decisions and whether there would be an appeals process.15 It was also 
suggested that there was a need for an appeals process at the institutional 
level regarding classification of research prior to submission to the funding 
agency.16 In conclusion, additional guidance, clarification, and training 
materials all seem critical in order to move forward. 
The H5N1 Funding Framework Policy requires additional review at the 
funding agency level for proposals anticipating to generate Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses transmissible among 
mammals by respiratory droplets, which could add to the already protracted 
review process by the National Institute of Health (NIH) and ultimately 
discourage researchers from attempting certain experiments that could be 
beneficial from a public health point of view.17 
Despite these widespread concerns over the new and proposed policies, 
certain advocates for stricter biosecurity oversight feel that the new 
requirements are still not stringent enough.18 
II.  HISTORY OF OVERSIGHT OF DUAL USE RESEARCH 
The concept of dual use research is not new, and in the past, the 
scientific community has demonstrated its ability to self-regulate when it 
came to responsible development of new technologies. After the Asilomar 
Conference in 1975, scientists designed and followed a set of guidelines for 
work with recombinant DNA, then a novel technology of unexplored 
potential.19 This led to the publication of the NIH Guidelines for Research 
Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules.20 Later, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) and NIH collaborated on the Biosafety in 
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL).21 These two 
documents have been highly successful in protecting individual 
 
 14. Letter from Alan I. Leshner to Franca Jones, supra note 9. 
 15. Id.; Letter from Hunter Rawlings and Anthony P. DeCrappeo to Franca Jones, supra 
note 11, at 2-3. 
 16. Letter from Hunter Rawlings and Anthony P. DeCrappeo to Franca Jones, supra note 
11, at 4. 
 17. See Letter from David Relman to Franca Jones, supra note 4, at 1; Wolinetz, supra 
note 10, at 1526. 
 18. Malakoff & Enserink, supra note 13, at 1025. 
 19. COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE APPLICATION 
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF 
TERRORISM 30 (2004) [hereinafter FINK REPORT]. 
 20. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra, note 5. 
 21. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BIOSAFETY IN MICROBIOLOGICAL AND 
BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES 3-4 (5th ed. 2009). 
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biotechnology workers and the public. However, in the wake of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, letters containing anthrax bacteria were 
mailed to several news media offices and to two U.S. Senators, killing five 
people and sickening seventeen others.22 Less than one year later, two 
pieces of legislation were signed into law: The Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of October 2001, (Patriot Act)23 and The Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
(Bioterrorism Response Act).24 These laws regulated who, for what purpose, 
and in what circumstances individuals could possess and transfer any 
biological agent, specifically addressing a list of restricted agents known as 
Select Agents, a term coined at the time the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 was enacted.25 
Subsequent to the 2001 and 2002 legislations, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) developed the Select Agents Regulations.26 Another consequence of 
these events was the infusion of billions of dollars into infectious disease 
research, which, perhaps ironically, encouraged and increased the study of 
Select Agents by researchers.27 
While they provided the official impetus for these new legislations, the 
events of September 2001 alone did not raise awareness of the potential for 
misuse of biotechnology. Although bioweapons had been used since 
antiquity, only earlier that year, a pest control experiment conducted by an 
Australian researcher reminded the scientific community and the public of 
the inherent dangers of life sciences research.28 In an attempt to render 
 
 22. JEANNE GUILLEMIN, AMERICAN ANTHRAX: FEAR, CRIME, AND THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
NATION’S DEADLIEST BIOTERROR ATTACK, xx-xxi (Henry Holt & Co. 2011). 
 23. Uniting and Strenghtening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001) (codified in various sections of the United States Code). 
 24. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002). 
 25. Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 511, 
110 Stat. 1214, 1284. See also About Us, NAT’L SELECT AGENT REGISTRY, ANIMAL & PLANT 
HEALTH INSPECTION SERV. & CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.select 
agents.gov/AboutUS.html (last updated June 11, 2013). 
 26. 7 C.F.R. pt. 331 (2012); 9 C.F.R. pt. 121 (2012); 42 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2012). 
 27. Jerry Jaax, Administrative Issues Related to Infectious Disease Research in the Age of 
Bioterrorism, 46 INST. FOR LABORATORY ANIMAL RES. J. 8, 8-9 (2005). See Public Health 
Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness & Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 125, 
116 Stat. 614. 
 28. See Ronald J. Jackson et al., Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant 
Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic 
Resistance to Mousepox, 75 J. OF VIROLOGY 1205 (2001). 
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female mice sterile by having them mount an immune response against their 
own eggs, researchers used the mousepox virus as a delivery system for the 
self-antigens.29 Unfortunately, the recombinant virus, which also carried 
immune-modulatory genes, depressed rather than stimulated the immune 
response of the mice to the mousepox virus, which subsequently died, even 
if they had been vaccinated and even if the mice used were of a mousepox-
resist.30 This raised concerns that if similar modifications were made to the 
smallpox virus, the vaccine could become ineffective.31 
In 2002, Dr. Eckard Wimmer, a German American virologist, 
synthesized the full genome of the poliovirus and used it to produce 
infectious polioviruses de novo, raising concerns that individuals who may 
not have otherwise access to them could use similar techniques to produce 
more dangerous organisms.32 Finally, also in 2002, it was found that 
genetic manipulations of the vaccinia virus, normally relatively harmless to 
humans, but a close relative of the virus causing smallpox, could perhaps 
render vaccinia as virulent as smallpox.33 Due to these and similar 
instances, the research community became engaged in a debate on how to 
deal with life sciences research with potential for dual use.34 
In 2004, the National Research Council’s Committee on Research 
Standards & Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of 
Biotechnology published a report entitled, Biotechnology Research in An Age 
of Terrorism: Confronting The “Dual Use” Dilemma (Fink Report).35 The 
recommendations of the Fink Report included an enhanced oversight 
system, initially based on current legislation, for seven types of “Experiments 
of Concern,” which would be those that: 
(1) Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective. 
(2) Would confer resistance to antibiotics or antivirals. 
(3) Would enhance a pathogen's virulence or render a non-pathogen 
virulent. 
(4) Would increase a pathogen's transmissibility. 
(5) Would alter a pathogen's host range. 
 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. at 1208. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Eckard Wimmer, The Test-tube Synthesis of a Chemical Called Poliovirus, 7 EUR. 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S3, S8 (2006). 
 33. Ariella M. Rosengard et al., Variola Virus Immune Evasion Design: Expression of a 
Highly Efficient Inhibitor of Human Complement, 99 PROC. OF THE NAT’L. ACAD. OF SCI. 8808, 
8808 (2002). 
 34. Wolinetz, supra note 10, at 1525. 
 35. See FINK REPORT, supra note 19. 
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(6) Would enable evasion of diagnostic tests. 
(7) Would enable weaponization of pathogens and toxins.36 
 At the publication stage, this oversight would rely on self-governance of 
scientists and scientific journals.37 Other recommendations focused on the 
need for education of the scientific community about the potential for the 
dual use of certain research endeavors and its moral responsibility to help 
mitigate these risks.38 It also advocated for better communication channels 
internationally, as well as between the scientific community and law 
enforcement agencies.39 Most significantly, the Fink Report advised the 
creation of the National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense (NSAAB) by 
HHS to provide guidance and leadership for oversight of research with dual 
use potential.40 
As suggested by the Fink Report, NSABB was soon established and had 
its first meeting in 2005.41 Its current role is to advise the U.S. Government 
on how to minimize the risk from: 
[R]esearch that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably 
anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be 
directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, 
agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment or material, 
defined as ‘Dual Research of Concern’ or ‘DURC.’42 
The threshold for being DURC takes into account scope (breadth of 
consequences) and immediacy (whether results can be directly misapplied) 
of potential threat. NSABB is staffed with subject matter experts from 
scientific and security communities –– ex officio government 
representatives.43 NSABB has several working groups including: 
international engagement, synthetic genomics, culture of 
responsibility/personnel reliability, code of conduct, communications, dual 
use criteria, and an ad hoc H5N1 working group.44 These groups have 
helped publish background and educational material on the Office of 
Biotechnology’s website that is aligned with the mission of NSABB. 
 
 36. Id. at 113, 114-15. 
 37. Id. at 8. 
 38. Id. at 113-15. 
 39. Id. at 111. 
 40. FINK REPORT, supra note 19, at 123. 
 41. Dana A. Shea, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33342 OVERSIGHT OF DUAL-USE BIOLOGICAL 
RESEARCH: THE NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY 2, 4 (2007). 
 42. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity – Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L. 
INSTS. OF HEALTH, OFF. OF BIOTECH. ACTIVITIES, http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/faqs/NSABB_ 
FAQs_NEW_FINAL.pdf (last viewed Oct. 16, 2013). 
 43. Shea, supra note 41, at 3. 
 44. Id. at 3-4. 
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Before NSABB had its first meeting, a controversial manuscript was 
published describing how a minute quantity of butolinum toxin dispersed at 
one dairy plant could kill 400,000 people.45 With NSABB not yet 
operational, the author of the manuscript and the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) resisted pressure from HHS not to 
publish it.46 PNAS’s rationale was that the public should be aware of the 
danger and that free and open scientific inquiry ultimately makes the public 
safer.47 The author later stated that he would have welcomed the advice of 
NSABB had it been provided at that time.48 
In September of 2005, there was a closed NSABB session to consider 
the publication of manuscripts about the reconstructed 1918 influenza 
virus,49 which was subsequently added to the list of Select Agents.50 The 
1918 pandemic flu caused up to 50 million deaths worldwide, but since 
viruses of the same sub-type had been in circulation since, it was believed 
that the vast majority of the world population would have sufficient cross-
immunity to fight the 1918 virus.51 Of note, this belief was challenged 
during the time of the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (swine flu), although it was later 
demonstrated that the vaccine against swine flu would likely be protective 
against the 1918 pandemic flu.52 After considering the significance of the 
information to the scientific community and public health, the risk of the 
information being misused, the benefits of communicating the information, 
and the consequences of restricting the information so that the public would 
not have access to it, NSABB recommended the publication of the 
manuscripts with some modifications that would emphasize the public health 
benefits of the research and the precautions that were taken during the 
 
 45. See Lawrence M. Wein & Yifan Liu, Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: 
The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk, 102 PROC. OF THE NAT’L. ACAD. OF SCI. 9984, 9985, 
9987 (2005) (discussing the controversial manuscript by authors Lawrence Wein & Yifan Liu). 
 46. Bruce Alberts, Modeling Attacks on the Food Supply, 102 PROC. OF THE NAT’L. ACAD. 
OF SCI. 9937, 9937 (2005) (editorial from the President of the National Academy of 
Sciences). 
 47. Meeting Minutes, Nat’l Sci. Advisory Bd. for Biosecurity, Summary of Second NSABB 
Meeting 15 (Nov. 21, 2005) (on file with the Office of Biotechnology Activities). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 42 C.F.R. § 73.3(b) (2012). 
 51. Letter from Michael T. Osterholm, Dir., Minn. Ctr. of Excellence for Influenza 
Research and Surveillance to Amy P. Patterson, Assoc. Dir. for Sci. Policy, Nat’l. Insts. of 
Health 6 (Apr. 12, 2012). 
 52. Rafael A. Medina et al., Pandemic 2009 H1N1 Vaccine Protects Against 1918 
Spanish Influenza Virus, NATURE COMMC’NS, June 15, 2010, at 1, 2, http://www.nature.com/ 
ncomms/journal/v1/n3/full/ncomms1026.html. 
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research to protect the researchers and the public.53 This example set an 
informal precedent for the deliberations that took place regarding the 
publication of two manuscripts discussing the making of mammalian-
aerosol transmissible HPAI viruses of the H5N1-subtype six years later, 
which ultimately triggered the enactment of the U.S. Government policies 
discussed herein.54 Of note, HPAI had never been known to be transmissible 
between mammals, except inefficiently in a close contact ferret model.55 The 
studies led by Dr. Ron Fouchier, Ph.D., at Erasmus Medical Center in 
Rotterdam, Netherlands, and Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka, Ph.D., at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, were first presented at the European 
Scientific Working Group on Influenza in Malta in September 2011.56 Not 
surprisingly, the research attracted a lot of attention, and in November 
2011, NSABB met to debate whether two resulting manuscripts submitted to 
Science and Nature should be published.57 “After deliberating amongst 
themselves and talking with both papers’ lead authors, the 23 NSABB 
members voted unanimously to recommend the two journals redact key 
parts of the manuscripts, allowing the sensitive portions to be made 
available to researchers only on a need-to-know basis.”58 “Although under 
no legal obligation to do so, the journals and researchers agreed….59” 
However, “Science stipulated that the U.S. government would need to 
provide a ‘written, transparent plan’ for making the redacted information 
available for ‘all those responsible scientists who request it’ as part of their 
work.”60 
By December 2011, the controversy became public knowledge, and a 
heated debate ensued “across the Internet, in the media, and at 
conferences” about the appropriateness and communication of the 
 
 53. Meeting Minutes, Nat’l Sci. Advisory Bd. for Biosecurity, Summary of Second NSABB 
Meeting 15 (Nov. 21, 2005) (on file with the Office of Biotechnology Activities). 
 54. See, e.g., Michael T. Osterholm & David A. Relman, Creating a Mammalian-
Transmissible A/H5N1 Influenza Virus: Social Contracts, Prudence, and Alternative 
Perspectives, 205 J. INFECT. DIS. 1636, 1636 (2012). 
 55. Amy P. Patterson et al., A Framework for Decisions about Research with HPAI H5NI 
Viruses, 339 SCI. 1036, 1036 (2013); Hui-Ling Yen et al., Ineffcient Transmission of H5N1 
Infuenza Viruses in a Ferret Contact Model, 81 J. VIROLOGY 6890, 6897 (2007). 
 56. INFLUENZA TIMES, European Scientific Working Group on Influenza (ESWI), Malta, Sep. 
11-14, 2011, http://labs.fhcrc.org/cbf/Papers/H5N1_docs/FEIC_news_from_Malta.pdf. 
 57. See Press Release, Nat’l Institutes of Health, NSABB Review of H5N1 Research (Dec. 
20, 2011) (on file with authors). 
 58. Wendee Holtcamp, One Study, Two Paths The Challenge of Dual-Use Research, 120 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A239, A240 (2012). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at A240 (quoting Statement by Dr. Bruce Alberts, Editor-in-Chief, Sci., Regarding 
Publication of H5N1 Avian Influenza Research, (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.aaas.org/news/ 
releases/2011/media/1220herfst_statement.pdf). 
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researchers’ work, the risks associated with the work, potential partial or 
complete censorship of scientific publications, and DURC in general.61 After 
NSABB’s decision, “39 influenza researchers, including Dr. Fouchier and 
Dr. Kawaoka, voluntarily agreed to a 60-day moratorium on H5N1 
research,” which was later informally extended to a year.62 “With the 
research moratorium in place and the papers delayed, scientists and public 
health officials convened at several international meetings to debate the 
dilemma.”63 Then, “a February 2012 meeting convened at the [World 
Health Organization] WHO headquarters in Geneva culminated in a letter 
signed by 22 scientists and public-health officials from 11 nations calling for 
full publication of the H5N1 papers — in contrast to NSABB’s 
recommendation” –– after biosecurity and communications issues were 
addressed.64 Subsequently, the U.S. Government had NSABB reconsider 
their original decision based on the WHO consultation, which yielded more 
details about the two studies.65 
Dr. Kawaoka66 had not used a full H5N1 virus. He had used one gene 
(coding for the hemaglutinin (HA) protein –– a surface receptor) from the 
HPAI H5N1 virus out of eight.67 The other seven genes were from the 
pandemic 2009 virus, a virus already adapted to humans.68 Out of four 
mutations generated in the H5N1 HA gene, three of these were generated 
through in vitro, and one of these was generated through live infection in 
ferrets, a technique called passaging that was first used by Louis Pasteur in 
the nineteenth century.69 Two of these mutations affected receptor specificity 
that is critical for transmissibility amongst humans, one affected replication 
in the nose, which is also critical for transmissibility by aerosol, and another 
affected fusion of viral particles to human cells.70 The resulting virus 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.; Patterson et al., supra note 55, at 1036. 
 63. Holtcamp, supra note 58, at A240. 
 64. Id.; WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT ON TECHNICAL CONSULTATION ON H5N1 RESEARCH 
ISSUES (Feb. 16-17, 2012) (on file with authors). 
 65. Holtcamp, supra note 58, at A240. 
 66. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Scientist Plays Down Danger of Flu Strain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2012, at A16.  
 67. Masaki Imai et al., Experimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers respiratory 
droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets, 486 NATURE 420, 420 
(2012). 
 68. Id. at 423; Yo Han Jang et al., Cold-Adapted Pandemic 2009 H1N1 Influenza Virus 
Like Vaccine Elicits Cross-Reactive Immune Responses against Seasonal and H5 Influenza A 
Viruses, 86 J. VIROLOGY 5953, 5953 (2012). 
 69. Imai et al., supra note 67, at 420. See also Louis Pasteur et al., De l’attenuation des 
virus et de leur retour a la virulence, 92 LES COMPTES RENDUS DE L’ACADÉMIE DES SCIENCES 
[C.R. ACAD. SCI.] 430-35 (1881) (Fr.). 
 70. Id. at 422-24. 
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attached to human upper respiratory cells, successfully infected ferrets, and 
was transmissible by aerosol between ferrets.71 The infections caused lesions 
and weight loss, but no deaths.72 Furthermore, the resulting virus reacted 
with the current H5N1 vaccine, which was only made in limited quantities.73 
Provided the vaccine would elicit a sufficient immune response, it may be 
protective against a virus with this mutated HA gene.74 Of note, there are 
currently H5N1 viruses circulating which are only three mutations away from 
this version of the H5N1 HA gene. 
Dr. Fouchier, on the other end, started with a different, but whole HPAI 
H5N1 virus.75 He created five mutations, four in the HA gene, and one in 
the PB2 gene, which affects with viral replication.76 Passaging in ferrets 
generated two of these mutations.77 The resulting virus attached to human 
upper respiratory cells, successfully infected ferrets, and was transmissible by 
aerosol between ferrets.78 Again, the infections caused lesions and weight 
loss, but no deaths.79 The resulting virus reacted with the current H5N1 
vaccine, and was also sensitive to Oseltamivir, an antiviral medication that 
considered effective against avian influenza, although some instances of 
resistance have already occurred.80 Again, there are currently circulating 
H5N1 viruses that are only one mutation away from this version of the 
hemaglutinin gene. 
It is important to clarify that wild type HPAI H5N1 viruses are lethal in 
ferrets as was the mutated virus in Dr. Fouchier’s experiment when he 
administered it directly into the trachea, not a natural mode of infection.81 
Similarly, intranasal administration of these viruses in their wild type form 
causes morbidity and sometimes mortality; however, no mortality was 
observed with Dr. Fouchier’s virus when administered in this manner.82 Prior 
studies have shown that HPAI H5N1 viruses can be transmitted by direct or 
indirect contact exposure, including via respiratory droplets, but the results 
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are inconsistent.83 What sets the two contentious experiments apart is the 
fact that the transmissions observed not only occurred efficiently, but by 
strictly natural means, such as when ferrets were exposed to the sneezing of 
other ferrets infected by experimental means.84 Another essential point is 
that the mutations identified in Dr. Kawaoka’s and Dr. Fouchier’s studies, 
while yielding similar results, were not identical, and neither were the wild 
type viruses which were used as starting points.85 This suggests that different 
lineages of HPAI H5N1 viruses and different mutations could yield airborne-
transmissible viruses.86 
On March 29-30, 2012, NSABB reconsidered its initial decision87 in 
light of the additional information suggesting that the research may not have 
been as dangerous as initially feared, that it would be of value to 
surveillance efforts, and that it had been conducted at an appropriate 
biosafety level.88 NSABB voted –– although not unanimously in the case of 
Dr. Fouchier’s study –– in favor of publication of both revised papers in 
full.89 Another factor in their decision was the lack of an established process 
to share the most sensitive information contained in the manuscripts solely 
on a “need to know” basis and the wish to avoid the perception that the 
U.S. may withhold information critical to HPAI surveillance.90 NSABB 
members who still opposed the decision felt that a focus on these particular 
viruses and mutations for surveillance would be misguided and that 
airborne-transmissible HPAI should only be studied at Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 
certified labs/facilities, the highest biosafety level available.91 Interesting to 
note, Dr. Kawaoka’s and Dr. Fouchier’s studies were performed only at 
enhanced BSL-3 labs/facilities.92 Nonetheless, Dr. Kawoaka’s and Dr. 
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Fouchier’s experiments were published in their entirety in May 2012 and 
June 2012, respectively.93 
While NSABB finalized its deliberations regarding these manuscripts, 
HHS released the DURC Policy on March 29, 2012.94 The scope of the 
DURC Policy was limited to HPAI H5N1 viruses, the reconstructed 1918 
pandemic virus, and Tier 1 Select Agents, which require additional 
precautions and training of personnel.95 The DURC was applicable to the 
seven categories of experiments of concern originally defined in the Fink 
Report.96 The DURC Policy defines responsibilities for federal agencies to 
conduct a review of funded projects and devise risk mitigation plans, which 
span the entire research life cycle from funding through publication.97 The 
responsibilities of the PIs and research institutions are not clearly delineated 
in the DURC Policy beyond collaborating on the risk mitigation plan and 
implementation, reviewing emerging research findings for DURC, and as the 
case may be, notifying the funding agencies.98 After the DURC Policy went 
into effect, “NIH conducted a review of its grants and found 381 extramural 
and 404 intramural projects [using pathogens or toxins] covered by th[e] 
policy.”99 Ten of the extramural projects were designated as DURC, 
including seven influenza experiments, and the others used anthrax, plague, 
and botulism.100 A mitigation plan was devised in each case.101 
This first policy was followed approximately one year later by two 
additional and preliminary pieces of legislation; the goal of which was to 
provide additional details regarding DURC oversight by research 
institutions102 and funding of airborne-transmissible H5N1 HPAI.103 In the 
proposed Oversight Policy the roles and responsibilities of the PIs, research 
institutions, funding agencies, and U.S. Government were more clearly 
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defined.104 For instance, the Oversight Policy states that PIs should conduct 
regular assessments of their work to determine whether it falls under the 
scope of the DURC Policy, be knowledgeable and aware of the risks of dual 
use research, provide DURC education for their personnel, and be 
compliant with institutional and federal policies, as well as with any risk 
mitigation plan decided for their projects by funding agencies and their 
institution.105 It goes on to state that research institutions should “provide 
education and training on DURC,” regularly assess the effectiveness of their 
DURC policies, provide an appeal mechanism for affected PIs, and remain 
in compliance with federal funding agencies regarding determination of 
DURC and “implementation of risk mitigation plan[s].”106 However, the 
DURC Policy does not dictate which entity within research institutions will be 
responsible for compliance.107 Federal funding agencies should be there as 
a resource to PIs and research institutions, but their most important role is to 
determine DURC at the funding stage, devise mitigation plans which cover 
the entire life cycle of the research from funding through publication, and 
respond to reports of non-compliance from research institutions.108 Finally, 
the U.S. Government’s role is to develop training and outreach tools and 
materials to be used by funding agencies, research institutions, and PIs to 
“periodically assess the impact of the DURC policy on life sciences research” 
and biosecurity,109 as such assessment could lead to eventual revisions of 
the policy. 
Regarding mitigation plans, decisions affecting communication of the 
research are the most likely to cross into uncharted territory, as they could 
call for modification of content (with either addition of contextual 
information, or removal of substantive information), timing (publication 
could be delayed), or distribution (with restrictions or even classification). In 
the proposed H5N1 Funding Framework Policy, an additional two-tiered 
(funding agency and department-level) review beyond scientific merit and 
DURC is required for projects involving HPAI H5N1 viruses that are 
transmissible among mammals by respiratory droplets.110 The goal of this 
additional step is to ensure that generated viruses could be the result of a 
natural evolution process and, therefore, be relevant to real life scenarios, 
that adequate safety precautions are set in place, that research stands to 
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significantly contribute to public health and biosecurity, and that no viable 
alternatives exist to obtain the same answers.111 
III.  CHALLENGES WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF DUAL USE RESEARCH POLICIES 
Comments elicited by the Oversight Policy express significant concerns 
regarding the ability of research institutions to achieve and remain in 
compliance.112 As noted in the introduction, IBCs, created specifically to 
oversee research involving DNA recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid 
molecules, are already overburdened and underfunded because they also 
assume responsibility for oversight of all activities with biohazards, including 
compliance with Select Agents Regulations.113 Tasking them with DURC 
oversight seems logical and efficient, but may not be practical for some 
institutions. IBCs may have to create separate committees or hire outside 
entities, which has the potential for a significant slowdown of the research 
enterprise that is already besieged with regulations, even if justifiably so. The 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), in 
collaboration with the “Association of American Universities (AAU), 
Association of Public and Land-grant Universities, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation” held a meeting that focused on sharing best practices of 
existing institutional program review and oversight of DURC.114 The fact that 
necessary expertise for DURC review may not be available in current IBCs or 
within certain institutions increases the chances that consulting with outside 
bodies will be necessary. However, the requirement for a mechanism for 
review on demand at any time a PI identifies DURC potential115 makes the 
involvement of external entities difficult since the university “may have little 
control over when the review body is available.”116 Therefore, there is a 
possibility that these additional layers of regulations and compliances 
ultimately discourage individual researchers and institutions from 
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undertaking research that would enhance U.S. biosecurity, or they may 
simply increase chances of unintentional non-compliance.117 
There is also the distinct possibility that DURC regulations, as enacted or 
currently proposed, are not sufficient to serve their purpose. As experience 
amply demonstrated,118 research with DURC does not necessarily involve 
Select Agents or HPAI. Even seemingly innocuous research could have dual 
use implications, if not immediately, at some point in the future. One 
example is a 1997 study that resulted in the design of a more efficient 
delivery system for aerosolized medicines, carrying them deep into the lungs, 
with nefarious potential that did not become evident until the anthrax scare 
of 2001.119 Another example is in 1943, botany student Arthur Galston 
published his thesis on chemicals that were use to hasten the development 
of flowering plants.120 Military researchers read and then used Galston’s 
findings to develop the defoliant Agent Orange, a chemical that was used in 
the Vietnam War and has caused human health problems ever since.121 
There are also those agents, which despite being restricted, can be 
recovered from the environment or animals in endemic regions, or that can 
be made in the laboratory.122 While regulations limit access to these agents 
through regular channels, they certainly do not prevent motivated individuals 
from acquiring or making them.123 Another issue is that species are not as 
well delineated in the microbial world as would be necessary to exclude the 
possibility that two different species belong to the same genus.124 The 
bottom line is that list-based regulations may be completely insufficient if 
they are to prevent misuse of research results.125 It is possible that certain 
future federal funding opportunities will focus on dual use research with 
acceptance of the funds contingent upon pre-publication review and other 
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restrictive measures consistent with the proposed policies.126 It is important 
to note that this will not resolve the fact that many projects will still carry the 
potential for DURC, even if they are not identified by the funding agency as 
such at the beginning of the research cycle or preselected in response to 
funding opportunities. 
According to the DURC Policy already in place, federal DURC oversight 
begins when a project is considered for funding, which may be too late in 
some cases considering that much communication about the research takes 
place prior to grant submission, including when preliminary experiments are 
shared at the occasion of scientific conferences.127 In any event, the U.S. 
Government funds only about 31% of the total research and development 
efforts in the U.S.128 Research funded by entities other than the U.S. 
Government may involve academia, industry (including small start-up 
companies), non-profit organizations, contract research organizations, trade 
associations, industry consortia, investors, and may be performed in a 
variety of settings, even in private homes in the case of self-funded home 
experimenters. This leaves many projects flying under the federal radar until 
publication, and increases the likelihood of untimely incomplete, or even 
unenforceable stopgap measures after the research is already done and the 
results disseminated. 
Research covered under the new policies requires a considerable need 
for self-policing on the part of institutions and PIs, and because of that, 
there is much room for error. There is a need for a more bottom-up 
approach to complete, or in many cases replace, top-down oversight by the 
U.S. Government. Another limitation of relying too much on top-down 
oversight is a lack of working relationships and trust between life sciences 
research and security communities. Life scientists, unlike their counterparts in 
nuclear physics and cryptography, are accustomed to readily sharing, and 
in-turn gaining, access to information. However, the flow of information with 
security experts is one-directional, although they may use that information to 
make decisions regarding enforcement of DURC policies with little or no 
input from the scientific community. This culture chasm makes it difficult for 
scientists to adjust to the new and still evolving status quo. Yet WHO 
reported that both communities needed each other’s expertise to make 
effective decisions and policies regarding DURC.129 
Good will and cooperation on the part of the scientific community is all 
the more critical since the government generally has no authority to classify 
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information unless it was produced within a certain pre-agreed framework, 
usually in government laboratories or in fulfillment of government 
contracts.130 The only two exceptions are information related to nuclear 
weapons, which is “born classified,” and information received as part of a 
patent application.131 Beyond classification, limiting general access to 
research results is new territory, and there is not a mechanism to identify this 
information in a timely manner nor an entity that could store and distribute it 
according to criteria that does not yet exist. Establishing clear guidelines as 
to when information needs to become restricted and what penalties would 
follow, if either primary or secondary dissemination occurred, would need to 
be articulated and then enforced. 
In fact, the DURC Policy geared at limiting the dissemination 
(publication) of dual use research contradicts existing federal regulations 
and policies related to export controls and fundamental research.132 Both 
the Export Administration Regulations133 and the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations134 contain exclusions for fundamental research. To qualify as 
“fundamental research,” basic and applied science and engineering 
research activities must be those ordinarily published and shared broadly 
within the scientific community.135 They must also be free from pre-
publication review, except for determining whether patent rights are being 
compromised or proprietary information is being divulged.136 This 
“Fundamental Research Exclusion” (FRE) is the primary means by which U.S. 
universities engage in research related to dual use technologies without the 
need for export control licenses.137 Such licenses are costly and the process 
takes considerable time. The cost and time barriers prevent universities from 
engaging in export controlled projects without the availability of exclusions 
and exemptions. This is especially true in the case of deemed exports, which 
essentially make granting access to export-controlled technological 
information (not physical items) to a foreign national (person) in the U.S. the 
same as if they were in their home country. Such limitations on the free 
exchange of ideas and research activities present both practical and 
philosophical challenges to universities. In many instances, universities have 
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implemented policies and procedures that limit research projects to those 
that qualify as fundamental research and/or would otherwise not require 
preventing or limiting the involvement of foreign nationals.138 As a result, 
most federally funded research conducted on U.S. university campuses is 
unrestricted and exempt from export controls.139 Moreover, federal funding 
agencies encourage publication and presentation of the research findings. 
Prevailing best practice in university export control compliance is oriented 
toward seeking out any contract clause or side deal that may prohibit or 
limit public dissemination (e.g., pre-publication review) for fear that this 
would invalidate the FRE. This is an example of how regulations sometimes 
limit the scope of the research enterprise in the U.S. 
Several scientific journals have performed pre-publication review of 
scientific manuscripts for DURC content voluntarily since 2003. This review 
is a response to their own risk analysis rather than that of an external entity, 
and their conclusions may differ substantially from those of NSABB or the 
U.S. Government. During Dr. Kawaoka’s and Dr. Fouchier’s controversy, 
both Science and Nature made it clear that their actions to delay publication 
and their considerations of changing the content were completely voluntary 
and would not be repeated in the future in similar circumstances.140 Journals 
do not have the infrastructure or mechanisms in place to limit the 
dissemination of information to a restricted audience beyond withholding 
publication or redaction, and doing so goes directly against their primary 
purpose. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The requirement for self-policing at the institutional and individual levels, 
combined with presumably heavy financial and possibly legal penalties in 
the event of non-compliance, is understandably troublesome to many. In this 
regard, DURC policies, as enacted or proposed, differ from those covering 
research with recombinant DNA, which is accomplished by a combination 
of local self-regulation and limited federal oversight.141 In the event of non-
compliance with these guidelines, the penalties are strictly financial at the 
individual or institutional level. Non-compliance with DURC policies, on the 
other hand, would be more consequential, due in part to the applicability of 
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Select Agents Regulations in many cases, and in all instances due to the 
implications for national security, similar to the significant civil and criminal 
penalties for violating the export control laws. Therefore, it is likely that 
institutions would want to involve a separate body to make final decisions, 
such as a federal entity like NSABB, or another independent entity, but 
without giving up complete control at the institutional level. 
Many institutions are not planning to review research for DURC potential 
due to the current scope of existing or proposed DURC policies, simply 
because they do not conduct Select Agents research. This may be imprudent 
considering the intent of DURC policies, which makes it likely that their 
scope will be expanded in the future. However, a number of institutions have 
already implemented institutional-level DURC policies.142 Some institutions 
review only research with Select Agents for DURC potential, while others 
review all research proposed by and conducted at the institution for 
associated DURC risks143 with compiled data from three different IBC 
surveys at public and private research institutions, hospitals, and clinics with 
response rates ranging from 29.2%–45.1%.144 Over 50% of the 
respondents indicated that IBCs reviewed research for potential DURC, and 
another 15% considered doing so.145 However, the survey indicated that 
only 37% of IBC members were being trained on dual-use risks.146 
Considering the sharp rise in the number of IBCs in the U.S. from 397 in 
2002, to 799 in 2010,147 and assuming a learning curve for newly formed 
IBCs and their members, it is difficult to ascertain whether IBCs across the 
U.S. are, in fact, qualified to the extent needed to ensure compliance with 
DURC policies for PIs and institutions, especially when DURC review is not 
their primary responsibility. 
Perhaps sharing the above concerns, some institutions have convened a 
committee separate from the IBC to review research involving Select Agents 
with DURC potential, but they are a small minority.148 These separate 
committees include scientific, medical, security, and safety experts.149 
Examples of such committees exist at Boston University and the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison.150 At Boston University, the formal review process starts 
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with the researchers responding to eight specific questions, which are 
designed to identify the seven types of experiments of concern.151 In this 
regard, this is similar to how proposals are identified as needing export 
control review.152 If warranted, the DURC review committee discusses the 
research with the PI, and a mitigation plan is designed in consultation with 
university officials and with NSABB.153 Because information gained during 
the course of any research might raise new questions or concerns regarding 
DURC, and to ensure buy-in of its community, Boston University preceded 
implementation of its institutional DURC Policy with a preliminary phase, 
which has consisted, since 2009, of diligent awareness and an education 
program for all research personnel and administrators.154  
The University of Wisconsin-Madison has a similar process with a heavy 
educational component.155 Identification of research with DURC potential 
does not necessarily start with the PI, however, it may also be initiated by 
any committee reviewing the research or by a funding agency.156 If such 
determination is made, the PI and relevant personnel meet with officials 
responsible for Select Agents and Toxins Regulations compliance for 
information gathering.157 This information is then forwarded to an IBC 
subcommittee to perform another interview with the PI to assess DURC 
potential of the research, and write a report to be presented to the entire 
IBC.158 The IBC conducts a vote, and if warranted, the report is forwarded to 
a separate committee, the Biosafety Task Force, for further discussion and 
vote, which includes input from the PI, until a consensus is reached 
regarding a mitigation plan.159 This plan is forwarded, along with the review 
process, to the funding agency for further guidance.160 
Research institutions differ by size, sector, funding sources, scientific 
expertise, and interests influencing the type of review and oversight process 
that may work best for them. The Boston University and University of 
Wisconsin-Madison examples illustrate that each institution should ideally 
come up with its own system to review and oversee DURC locally, but also 
suggests that best practices would include participation by an entity separate 
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from the IBC. While these two institutions formed separate committees 
internally, we believe that it would be highly beneficial to the research 
enterprise in the U.S. and abroad to adhere to a set of best practices, which 
would be reviewed on a regular basis by an independent accrediting body, 
operating internationally. We base this belief on several reasons. First, such 
an entity would be a source of additional expertise for institutions, as well as 
a means to ensure consistency in the identification, communication, and 
mitigation of those risks associated with DURC. This review body would not 
impose additional pressures or burdens on the research community, but 
would provide a source of non-punitive, confidential oversight. Furthermore, 
such a process would be consistent with the position taken during the WHO 
meeting held on February 26-28, 2013, where it was agreed that global 
guidance on DURC issues was badly needed.161 
There is a precedent in the research community for an independent 
accrediting body, which provides accreditation to research institutions 
committed to following best practices: the Association for Assessment and 
Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care International (AAALAC). AAALAC is 
a “private, nonprofit organization that promotes the humane treatment of 
animals in science through voluntary accreditation and assessment 
programs.”162 Its “purpose is to provide an open, fair, and impartial peer-
evaluation that results in valuable suggestions and information organizations 
can use to improve their programs.”163 To encourage “forthright dialogue 
that results” in significant improvements, “AAALAC assures its program 
participants that none of the details of their evaluations are made public,” 
and it does not share information with the public obtained through the 
accreditation process, except regarding whether or not the organization is 
accredited.164 “More than 880 companies, universities, hospitals, 
government agencies, and other research institutions in 37 countries have 
earned AAALAC accreditation,165 demonstrating their commitment” to 
excellence and the wide acceptance of this accrediting body. These 
institutions volunteer to participate in AAALAC's program, in addition to 
complying with the local, state, and federal laws that regulate animal 
research.166 Through accreditation, these institutions demonstrate that they 
go beyond meeting minimum standards required by law and go the extra 
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step to implement best practices. The U.S. Government and federal funding 
agencies recognize AAALAC accreditation and have different reporting 
requirements for institutions that are accredited. 
We believe that implementing a system of voluntary accreditation for 
research institutions performing research with DURC potential would 
maximize compliance with DURC policies and encourage adoption of the 
most effective and least burdensome practices. It would also improve the 
understanding of DURC issues by individual institutions without increasing 
the need for additional regulations. Most importantly, it would demonstrate 
a culture of scientific responsibility to the public. 
 
